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Abstract
Our empirical study stems from previous research on the inter-relations between resi-
dential status and microeconomic labour market outcomes. It focuses on employees and
assesses the a priori ambiguous effect of homeownership on job-match quality. We use
the French data set of the 1995-2001 European Community Household Panel to build a
subjective measure of job downgrading. We estimate a recursive trivariate probit with par-
tial observability that simultaneously models the residential status choice, its impact on
the probability of being downgraded, and the selection into employment. The comparison
with simpler models indicates that taking into account the selection into employment and
controlling unobservable individual heterogeneity are of prime necessity to obtain robust
conclusions.
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1 Introduction
During the last twenty years, homeownership has become more popular than home renting in
OECD countries. Germany is an exception since the homeownership rate has remained less
than 50% since the eighties. In other countries, homeownership rates have been increasing,
especially in Belgium, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Spain and the Netherlands, displaying
increases larger than 10% in two decades [Catte, Girouard, Price & Andre´ (2004, p.154)]. In
most OECD countries, this evolution results from the implementation of different policies in
favour of homeownership. France was no exception with several fiscal measures to promote
primary residence ownership: soft loans, reductions in taxes on donations and inheritance and
more recently the tax exemption on mortgage interests. Simultaneously the pro-cyclical be-
havior of banks contributed to this development with lower interest rates, longer loan maturity,
lower down payment requirements and variable-rate loans.
Some papers have described evolutions of the housing market and housing prices along
with the implementations of these policies. Others have adopted a more general analysis by
studying the indirect effects of changes in residential status structure. Those studies cover
several fields: economics, sociology, demography, education or political science1. Indeed, di-
rect as well as indirect consequences of public policies which favour the creation of “nations
of homeowners” must be assessed to gain insights about their relevance. However, such a sta-
tistical evaluation is delicate. Firstly, separating homeownership’s effects from those of other
characteristics is crucial but often difficult. The determinants of homeownership are numerous,
including economic factors often unavailable in the empirical data, such as permanent income.
Omitting a variable which influences both the likelihood of homeowning and the likelihood
of engaging in a particular behaviour causes the estimated impact of homeownership on the
outcome of interest to be biased. The coefficient of the homeownership variable also reflects
unobserved individual characteristics, which are correlated with homeownership and omitted
in the econometric specification. Secondly, the evaluation methods must take into account the
bidirectional interactions between homeownership and its potential effects. For example, the
home purchase and labour market decisions are often simultaneous: on the one hand, individ-
uals with a good situation in the labour market are more likely to overcome mortgage lender
constraints and also to be homeowner, and on the other hand, homeownership also influences
labour market participation. Consequently, a robust econometric specification must deal with
the potential endogeneity of the homeownership for the individual behaviours.
Our paper is related to the recent empirical literature on homeownership outcomes, which
has evolved along with statistical methods handling these econometric issues. A large part of
the research in this field focuses on the impact of homeownership on labour force behaviour2.
The debate was initiated in the nineties by Oswald (1996, 1998, 1999). His starting point
was the observation of a parallel evolution between increasing homeownership rate and the
1For a literature survey of all the micro-level consequences of homeownership, see for example Dietz & Haurin
(2003).
2For a literature survey, see Havet & Penot (2010).
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unemployment rate. During the last decades, most European countries have indeed experienced
strong increases both of the owner-occupation rate and of the unemployment rate. Oswald
mainly relates this positive relationship to homeowners’ mobility constraints, which would
entail shorter employment durations, longer unemployment spells, as well as inadequate jobs for
homeowners. Empirical literature has then concentrated on testing the two first aspects with
econometric models. Recent studies, dealing with the appropriate treatment of unobserved
heterogeneity and endogeneity problems, call into question the robustness and conclusions of
early ones [Oswald (1996, 1998), Coulson & Fisher (2002)]. For example, Munch, Rosholm
& Svarer (2006) for Denmark, van Vuuren (2009) for the Netherlands and Brunet, Havet
& Lesueur (2011) for France find that, other things being equal, homeowners have shorter
unemployment duration than renters, while Battu, Ma & Phimister (2008) and Brunet et al.
(2011) conclude to no significant difference between these two groups in the United-Kingdom
and the United States, respectively. Duration models including unobserved heterogeneity
and dealing with the endogeneity issue have also been applied to the study of homeownership
influence on professional mobility of employed individuals. Homeownership appears to generate
individual benefits in terms of stability on the labour market in several European countries:
de Graaff & van Leuvensteijn (2007), de Graaff, van Leuvensteijn & van Ewijk (2009), Munch,
Rosholm & Svarer (2008) and Battu et al. (2008) highlight that homeowners have longer
employment durations than their renters counterparts. This is conveyed through both a 25%
lower unemployment risk for homeowners, as well as 20% to 30% lower transition rates between
jobs.
Overall, most recent studies highlight rather better labour market outcomes for home-
owners, with reduced unemployment risks and also higher employment stability, which favour
intra-firm career prospects. However, to our knowledge there has not been yet any evaluation of
homeownership consequences with respect to job-match quality3, although some studies have
highlighted the role of mobility in reducing job mismatch (see e.g. Hensen, de Vries & Co¨rvers
(2009)). Indeed, unemployed homeowners might have a faster exit rate out of unemployment
because they are willing to lower their reservation wage and/or their job requirements in order
to avoid relocation costs should a distant job offer be accepted. For those homeowners who still
bear financial constraints, it might also be crucial to go back to employment quickly in order
to face loan payments. Regarding the population in employment, residential status’ influence
on job-match quality is a priori ambiguous.
More precisely, human capital and spatial mobility theories predict opposite effects of
homeowners’ employment stability on job-match quality. On the one hand, by being more
stable in employment, homeowners might acquire a higher level of specific human capital,
which improves the adequacy of their qualifications to their occupation requirements and/or
favour intra-firm promotions [Rosholm & Svarer (2004), Munch et al. (2008)]. Therefore, higher
employment stability of homeowners should be associated with superior job-match quality.
Moreover, homeowners are more involved in their social environment and benefit from better
“local” social networks in terms of job opportunities [David, Janiak & Wasmer (2010)]. On
3For the basics of job matching theory, see Jovanovic (1979) and Johnson (1978).
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the other hand, homeowners value housing amenities and their family’s stability, so that they
might accept some degree of professional mismatch between their skills and qualifications and
their job characteristics. Indeed, spatial mobility theories (see e.g. Simpson (1992) and Buchel
& van Ham (2003)) suggest that due to high mobility costs, homeowners are less prone to
make a residential move in order to take on a new job which would be a better match. In a
monopsonistic view of the labour market [see e.g. Boal & Ransom (1997), Bhaskar, Manning
& To (2002)], employers might exploit mobility constraints of homeowners in order to set
a discriminatory wage policy for a given education (and other productive factors) level, or
alternatively to hire more productive (educated) workers for a given level of wages. Thus, the
total effect of housing tenure on job-match quality has to be empirically assessed.
Following the well-known literature on overqualification, we use a job-downgrading measure
as an indicator of job-match quality. In a broad sense, job-downgrading or overqualification4
corresponds to “a situation where individuals have higher qualifications that those which are
usually required by the job they hold” [Hartog (2000), Fondeur (1999)]. Three main approaches
have been used for downgrading evaluation in the empirical literature, albeit each has its
own particular limitations [Hartog (2000), Sloane (2003), Nauze-Fichet & Tomasini (2002,
2006)]. The normative approach is based on the qualification content required for a particular
occupation, or conversely on the type of occupation a particular degree is specific to. Job
downgrading is then measured as the difference between required education in the job and
worker’s education level. The main drawback of this approach lies in the construction of
a correspondence grid between education levels and occupations, which is often debatable
and more importantly, evolving. The statistical approach does not resort to some a priori
established education level - occupation correspondence, but instead defines it on the basis of
observed occurrences in the sample between workers education levels and the type of job they
hold. Mismatch then occurs when a worker’s level of education is more than one standard
deviation above the mean level of education in her occupation. Again, this job downgrading
measure requires a precise job as well as education levels classifications. Lastly, the subjective
approach avoids these drawbacks by using a worker’s self-assessment on the suitability of their
qualifications or skills to her position. Following other authors (e.g. Alba-Ramirez & Bla´zquez
(2003), Budria & Moro-Egido (2009)), we use such a measure based on individuals’ statements
about their job satisfaction.
Beyond labour market outcomes, our paper also complements studies of the impact of
homeownership on household well-being. For example, Rossi & Weber (1996) and Dietz &
Haurin (2003) suggest that homeownership increases household’s life satisfaction, happiness
and positive self-perception. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Dietz & Haurin (2003), previous
studies on homeownership and self-perception were flawed because of a limited number of
control variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present our econometric method-
ology in section 2. The French data set of the 1995-2001 European Community Household
4In our paper, we will employ indifferently these two terms.
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Panel (ECHP), which contains information on labour and housing markets is detailed in sec-
tion 3, and results are given in section 4. Issues arising from the results are summarized in
section 5.
2 Econometric issues and modelling
Our objective is to estimate the impact of the residential status on the job-match quality,
which is measured by a dichotomous variable indicating whether the worker evaluates himself
as job-downgraded or not.
Homeownership also depends on the job-match quality, which reflects job stability and
expected earnings. Indeed, financial institutions grant mortgages under sufficient expected
earning conditions for any home purchase. Moreover, a job-downgraded individual, being
likely to try changing job in order to get a better match, might give up the idea of homeown-
ership because he anticipates a future job mobility. We thus have to take into account the
potential simultaneity between residential status and job downgrading. Since the homeown-
ership variable is probably endogeneous in the job downgrading equation, we cannot evaluate
the impact of homeownership on job downgrading by including a simple dichotomous variable
equal to 1 if the individual is homeowner and 0 otherwise.
One approach for dealing with this endogeneity issue is to estimate a bivariate probit, which
simultaneously models the probability to be a homeowner and the influence of homeownership
on the probability to be downgraded. The chosen specification is recursive, i.e. we retain as
preponderant explanatory variable of the job downgrading (yid) the fact to be homeowner or
not (yih). In discrete choice models, logical-consistency issues [Maddala (1983)] make difficult
the expression of the direct simultaneity between decisions. In particular, we cannot introduce
at the same time downgrading variable in the homeownership equation and the residential
status on the job downgrading equation. Consequently, we favour the direction that is rele-
vant for our problematic. The reciprocity of the relation is taken into account indirectly by the
introduction in the homeownership equation of explanatory variables explaining job downgrad-
ing. Moreover, the bivariate probit model allows correlation between error terms of the both
equations (downgrading and homeownership) and so allows controlling unobserved factors that
influence both processes. This interdependence is modelled by a correlation coefficient (ρhd).
More precisely, the formal specification of the bivariate model is the following:
yih =
{
1 if y∗ih = Ziγh + uih > 0
0 if y∗ih = Ziγh + uih 6 0,
(1)
yid =
{
1 if y∗id = yih α+ Viγd + uid > 0
0 if y∗id = yih α+ Viγd + uid 6 0,
(2)
where the error terms (uih,uid) follow a bivariate normal distribution:(
uih
uid
)
∼ N
[(
0
0
)
,
(
1 ρhd
ρhd 1
)]
. (3)
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Equations (1) and (2) respectively model individual probabilities of homeownership (yih =
1) and job-downgrading (yid = 1). The α coefficient captures the influence of residential status
on job-downgrading perceptions, with an a priori ambiguous sign. We can estimate those
equations by full-information maximum likelihood (FIML)5 from observed data for individuals
in employment.
However, restricting the estimation sample to employed individuals only might lead to
biased estimates: a sample bias will be introduced if the socioeconomics and other personal
characteristics of employed workers are significantly different from the rest of the population
(unemployed and inactive individuals). Indeed, stylized facts indicate that the population in
employment is for example more educated and has more labour market experience. Conse-
quently, we propose another econometric estimation on the whole population (employed as
well as non-employed individuals), and introduce an additional equation, which models the
selection process into employment. Therefore, we use a recursive trivariate probit model with
partial observability : we jointly estimate the equations of the residential status (yih), the labour
market status (employed or not) (yie) and the job-downgrading status (yid), which is only ob-
served for employed individuals. The partial observability comes from the censoring of the
job-downgrading variable according to the employment status. In the empirical literature,
studies based on multivariate probit with partial observability are still rare and mainly imple-
mented in bivariate specifications [Poirier (1980), Van de Ven & Van Praag (1981), Meng &
Schmidt (1985), Mohanty (2002), Di Pietro (2004)], except Cappellari & Jenkins (2004). The
formal specification is the following:
yie =
{
1 if y∗ie = Xiγe + uie > 0
0 if y∗ie = Xiγe + uie 6 0,
(4)
yih =
{
1 if y∗ih = Ziγh + uih > 0
0 if y∗ih = Ziγh + uih 6 0,
(5)
yid =
{
1 if y∗id = yih α+ Viγd + uid > 0 and yie = 1
0 if y∗id = yih α+ Viγd + uid 6 0 and yie = 1,
(6)
where the error terms (uie,uih,uid) follow a trivariate normal distribution:

uieuih
uid

 ∼ N



00
0

 ,

 1 ρeh ρedρeh 1 ρhd
ρed ρhd 1



 . (7)
5The associated likelihood is:
L(yh,yd|V,Z) =
Qn
i=1 { [Φ2(Ziγh, α+ Viγd, ρhd]
yih.yid + [Φ2(Ziγh,−α− Viγd,−ρhd]
yih.(1−yid)
. [Φ2(−Ziγh, Viγd,−ρhd]
(1−yih).yid) + [Φ2(−Ziγh,−Viγd, ρhd]
(1−yih).(1−yid) } ,
with Φ2 the cumulative function of the standard bivariate normal distribution.
5
Again, this model can be estimated by FIML because its likelihood function can be written
as follows:
L(ye,yh,yd|X,V,Z) =
∏n
i=1 { [Φ3(Ziγe, Xiγh, α+ Viγd; ρeh, ρed, ρhd)]
yie.yih.yid
. [Φ3(Xiγe, Ziγh,−α− Viγd; ρeh,−ρed,−ρhd)]
yie.yih.(1−yid)
. [Φ3(Xiγe,−Ziγh, Viγd;−ρeh, ρed,−ρhd)]
yie.(1−yih).yid
. [Φ3(Xiγe,−Ziγh,−Viγd;−ρeh,−ρed, ρhd)]
yie.(1−yih).(1−yid)
. [Φ2(−Xiγe, Ziγh;−ρeh)]
(1−yie).yih
. [Φ2(−Xiγe,−Ziγh; ρeh)]
(1−yie).(1−yih) } , (8)
where φ3 and Φ3 are the density and the cumulative functions of the standard trivariate normal
distribution, while φ2 and Φ2 corresponds to the bivariate case.
As the FIML estimation requires triple integrals calculations, we resort to simulation
with the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) algorithm and our estimates are the solution
of the maximization of the simulated log-likelihood [Greene (2003), Train (2003), Stern (2000),
Geweke, Keane & Runkle (1994)].
Finally, we propose to exploit the longitudinal dimension of our data to refine the con-
trol of unobserved individual heterogeneity, by using a nonparametric procedure (mass-point
approach). While in the two previous models, unobserved effects are represented by random
disturbances, these disturbances are now decomposed into two components. Beside a purely
random component, another source of variation captures the time-invariant individual hetero-
geneity. This distinction is possible because repeated observations on the same individual are
available. This time-invariant effect is supposed to be entirely captured by (νd,νh,νe) compo-
nents, whose correlation account for simultaneous variations in housing and labour markets
decisions that are not due to observable factors. This specification allows the isolation of indi-
vidual fixed effects from purely stochastic components in each equation. We thus distinguish
effects which arise from unobserved characteristics determining individual behaviour on the
labour and housing markets from random variations. For example, some unobserved individ-
ual characteristics such as negotiation or organization abilities, or capacity to lead a project,
might influence both the probability of homeownership (via mortgage negotiation) and the
probability of downgrading. Under these conditions, the unconditional likelihood is given by:
L =
∫
νd
∫
νh
∫
νe
L(ye,yh,yd|X,V,Z, νd, νh, νe)dF (νd, νh, νe), (9)
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where
L(ye,yh,yd|X,V,Z, νd, νh, νe) =
n∏
i=1
{ [Φ3(Ziγe + νe, Xiγh + νh, α+ Viγd + νd; ρeh, ρed, ρhd)]
yie.yih.yid
. [Φ3(Ziγe + νe, Xiγh + νh,−α− Viγd − νd; ρeh,−ρed,−ρhd)]
yie.yih.(1−yid)
. [Φ3(Ziγe + νe,−Xiγh − νh, Viγd + νd;−ρeh, ρed,−ρhd)]
yie.(1−yih).yid
. [Φ3(Ziγe + νe,−Xiγh − νh,−Viγd − νd;−ρeh,−ρed, ρhd)]
yie.(1−yih).(1−yid)
. [Φ2(−Ziγe − νe, Xiγh + νh;−ρeh)]
(1−yie).yih
. [Φ2(−Ziγe − νe,−Xiγh − νh; ρeh)]
(1−yie).(1−yih) } ,
and where F (.) is the cumulative distribution function of unobserved heterogeneity terms.
In practice, it is necessary to define the joint function F (.) of the unobserved heterogeneity
variables (νd,νh,νe). Following Hoynes (1996) and in the spirit of Heckman & Singer (1984),
we assume that these terms follow a discrete distribution with a finite number realizations.
More precisely, we adopt the non-parametric mass-point approach for F (.) by assuming that
individuals are distributed with probability p in two types. Each of them are defined by a
vector of mass points ν1 = (ν
1
d , ν
1
h, ν
1
e ) with probability p = p1 = Pr(νd = ν
1
d ,νh = ν
1
h,νe = ν
1
e )
and ν2 = (ν
2
d , ν
2
h, ν
2
e ) with probability p2 = (1 − p). The simplest specification for the joint
distribution is taken, allowing for two points for each unobservable (q = 1,2). The estimated
unconditional likelihood function is obtained by summing over the unobserved heterogeneity
components, i.e. by replacing the integration in equation (9) by a finite summation sign:
L =
2∑
q=1
pq.L(ye,yh,yd|X,V,Z, ν
q
d, ν
q
h, ν
q
e ). (10)
As the parameters p1 and p2 must belong to the interval [0,1] and their sum must be equal
to 1, we write pq as logit functions : p1 = 1/(1 + exp(pi1)) and p2 = exp(pi1)/(1 + exp(pi1)).
Therefore, in practice, the parameter pi1 is estimated and the probability p1 and p2 are next
calculated.
In section 4, the three previous models are applied to French data set of the 1995-2001
European Community Household Panel to evaluate the impact of the residential status on the
job-match quality perceptions. Comparing estimation results allow assessing the influence of
selection into employment and of unobserved heterogeneity.
3 Data
3.1 The French data set of the ECHP and sample description
The European Community Household Panel stems from the project of constitution of a Euro-
pean longitudinal individual database under the initiative of Eurostat. The French part was
7
collected by INSEE, between 1995 and 2001, and contains 18 916 individuals representing 7 344
households at the beginning of the survey. The European panel enables the tracking of mobile
individuals, their trajectories on the labour market and their living conditions, in particular
with regards to housing. However, we restrict the database to individuals between seventeen
and sixty years old, living in a conventional household. We exclude households constituted by
families implying indirect ascendants, or more than one direct ascendant, as well as, house-
holds which are not families. Also, we do not examine children still living in the parental home,
whose trajectories, both on the labour and housing markets, follow specific paths [see Cham-
baz (2001) and Laferre`re (2005)]. For employed individuals, we retained only clerks, workers,
intermediate and intellectual occupations and discard farmers and craftsmen. Moreover, we
only consider individuals who are either homeowners or renters in the private sector, and skip
social sector renters in order to keep a homogeneous category for renters. Links between social
housing sector and labour market outcomes require a specific research. Finally, our sample ac-
counts for approximately 7 700 individuals and 5 000 households for which information relative
to labour and housing markets is available. It corresponds to 18 654 observations, displaying
a homeownership rate equal to 75%. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics, distinguishing
homeowners and renters.
In France, households willing to purchase their home generally face two types of require-
ments from banks and credit institutions. One regards the amount of initial down payment as
the mortgage cannot exceed some fraction of the housing value. Beside, household earnings are
evaluated with respect to the monthly repayments that are entailed by the mortgage. Given
these institutional constraints on credit access, it is not surprising to observe from Table 1
that homeowners are more often in employment than renters, and that dual-earner households
more frequently own their homes. We also note that individuals employed in the public sector
are more often homeowners compared to individuals working in the private sector, given that
civil servants are usually more stable in employment and have more certain future income
streams. According to life-cycle process, as well as down payment constraints, homeowners are
on average older and have more labour market experience than private renters.
Table 2 describes the distribution by gender, age, level of diploma and labour market
experience of individuals according to their professional (employed or not) and residential
(owner or renter) statuses. Homeowners are on average older than renters, but those who are
employed tend to be relatively younger. This observation turns out valid for renters also. These
age differences mirror the distribution of individuals in terms of their labour market experience:
two thirds of the owners have more than twenty years of working experience, against hardly a
third for renters. Regarding individuals who have been on the labour market less than 10 years,
only 7% are homeowners. Globally, owners are more represented at the lowest educational
levels (no diploma, secondary education certificate, technical education) and less at higher
education levels. We also note that employed individuals, whether they are owners or renters,
have more human capital endowments than the inactive or unemployed individuals. Since
there are clear cut differences between employed and not employed individuals, there is no
reason to believe that the remaining sample after exclusion of non-employed individuals would
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Table 1: Sample individual characteristics for homeowners and private renters
Homeowners Renters Total
Labor market status
Inactivity 22.33 12.51 19.97
Unemployment 6.12 9.62 6.97
Employment 71.55 77.86 73.07
Female 0.53 0.51 0.53
Foreign nationality 0.03 0.05 0.03
Household type
Couple, no child. 0.23 0.27 0.24
Couple w. children 0.69 0.52 0.65
Single-parent family 0.03 0.06 0.04
Single person 0.05 0.15 0.07
Spouse’s status
Employed spouse 0.69 0.59 0.67
Unemployed spouse 0.05 0.08 0.05
Inactive spouse 0.15 0.11 0.14
NA 0.04 0.01 0.03
Age
17-29 years 0.04 0.29 0.10
30-39 years 0.27 0.37 0.29
40-49 years 0.37 0.21 0.33
50-60 years 0.32 0.13 0.27
Highest degree
No diploma or second. 0.36 0.26 0.34
Short technical educ. 0.34 0.33 0.34
Long tech. educ., highschool cert. 0.14 0.18 0.15
Under. High. educ. 0.10 0.14 0.11
Grad. High. educ. 0.05 0.09 0.06
Labor market experience
<= 5 years 0.01 0.11 0.03
6-10 years 0.05 0.21 0.09
11-20 years 0.24 0.33 0.26
> 20 years 0.70 0.34 0.61
Occupation
Clerk 0.37 0.36 0.37
Worker 0.28 0.28 0.28
Intellectual prof. 0.10 0.11 0.10
Intermediate prof. 0.25 0.25 0.25
Sector
Private sector 0.47 0.56 0.49
Public sector 0.23 0.21 0.23
NA 0.30 0.23 0.28
Inheritance or donation 0.05 0.04 0.05
Source: 1995-2001 ECHP, authors’ calculations
be random. Discarding non-employed individuals is likely to generate a sample selection bias,
9
an expectation that will be checked when comparing results from the bivariate and trivariate
models.
Table 2: Individual Features, by professionnal and residential statuses
Homeowners Renters
Empl. Non-Empl. Empl. Non-Empl.
Female 0.45 0.74 0.45 0.71
Age
17-29 years 0.05 0.03 0.30 0.25
30-39 years 0.31 0.17 0.38 0.33
40-49 years 0.42 0.23 0.21 0.21
50-60 years 0.22 0.56 0.11 0.20
Highest degree
No diploma or second. 0.31 0.49 0.24 0.35
Short technical educ. 0.36 0.29 0.34 0.31
Long tech. educ., highschool cert. 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.18
Under. High. educ. 0.12 0.07 0.15 0.10
Grad. High. educ. 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.06
Labor market exp.
<= 5 years 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.06
6-10 years 0.06 0.03 0.23 0.15
11-20 years 0.27 0.15 0.33 0.35
> 20 years 0.66 0.81 0.32 0.43
Source: 1995-2001 ECHP, authors’ calculations
3.2 Homeownership and job downgrading
The ECHP contains questions that provide enough information to assess the job-match quality
from a subjective perspective. More precisely, workers are allocated to the different types of
job match according to their responses to the following question: “Do you feel you have
skills or qualifications to do a more demanding job than the one you have now?”. People
reporting an affirmative answer are considered overqualified6. The definition of subjective
job-downgrading we retain here is identical to those of recent investigations on overeducation
with the ECHP data [Alba-Ramirez & Bla´zquez (2003), Budria & Moro-Egido (2009)]. This
subjective measure might raise some problems related to employees’ overestimation of the
required skills for their job, so that they can give more value to their professional activity.
Moreover, worker’s self-assessment might reproduce current hiring standards: if schooling levels
increase on the labour market and employers adapt their hiring standards, the stated necessary
schooling level increases while the job tasks do not change [Sicherman (1991)]. The subjective
measure of the job-match quality might thus be upward biased as mentioned by Hartog &
6We do not investigate potential discrepancies between qualifications and skills mismatch : see Quintini
(2011) for a review on the literature on this topic.
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Oosterbeek (1988). Nonetheless, insofar as downgrading feeling influences motivation and
thus productivity (see e.g.Green & Zhu (2010)), the objective content of the downgrading
assessment is not of prime importance for our matter of concern. Beside, evaluating the
impact of the homeownership on the job-downgrading requires only a relative measure of the
job-match quality that is comparable for the two groups.
Table 3: Job downgrading and residential status
Subjective Homeowners Renters Total
downgrading Number Pct Number Pct Number Pct
No 5924 48.2% 1827 43.2% 7751 46.9%
Yes 6366 51.8% 2404 56.8% 8770 53.1%
Total 12290 100% 4231 100% 16521 100%
Source: 1995-2001 ECHP, authors’ calculations
We see in Table 3 that 53% of all wage earners have the perception to be job downgraded.
This figure is close to what Budria & Moro-Egido (2009) find with the 2001 wave of the
ECHP and the same definition of job downgrading: the incidence of overqualified workers in
Europe is 59.5% ranging from 41.6% in Portugal to 68.3% in the United Kingdom, while the
proportion of overqualified workers is equal to 55% in France. The small difference with our
study probably comes from our sample restrictions and from the fact we use seven waves of
the ECHP7. Unfortunately, the proportion of overqualified workers can hardly be compared
with previous studies and other data: indeed, the empirical evidence on job downgrading
remains limited for France, most of the studies having dealt with young graduates on their
first job [Forgeot & Gautie´ (1997), Giret (2005), Nauze-Fichet & Tomasini (2002, 2006), Giret,
Nauze-Fichet & Tomasini (2006), di Paola & Moullet (2009)] or higher education graduates
[Guironnet (2006), Guironnet & Peypoch (2007)]. According to Hartog (2000), the incidence
of overqualification varies from 10% to 35% in some European countries (Netherlands, Spain,
Portugal and the United Kingdom), depending on the measure (normative or statistical). It
is also not surprising to obtain a higher job downgrading rate with the subjective approach.
Table 3 shows that renters feel more frequently downgraded than owners. However, this
descriptive result is not sufficient to infer that homeowners have advantageous positions on the
labour market. Indeed, homeowners and renters are not homogeneous categories, and we thus
estimate econometric models in order to control the influence of other covariates (education
level, age, labour market experience) in both processes of interest.
7For the 1995 survey, Alba-Ramirez & Bla´zquez (2003) find an overqualification rate equal to 53.8% in Spain
against 59.4% for Budria & Moro-Egido (2009) for the 2001 survey.
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4 Results
Three specifications are compared to illustrate the econometric issues: a bivariate model on
the sample of employed individuals, a trivariate model which takes into account the selection
in employment, and a trivariate model which in addition refines the control of unobserved
heterogeneity. According to the empirical literature [Battu, Belfield & Sloane (2000), Nauze-
Fichet & Tomasini (2002, 2006), Giret et al. (2006)] we retain in all specifications the following
explanatory variables V for job-downgrading: sociodemographic characteristics (gender, age,
experience, nationality, family structure, education levels, urban area size) ; job and firm char-
acteristics (occupation type, public/private job, sector of activity) ; residential status variable.
Given the partial observability of the job downgrading variable, job and firm characteristics
are only introduced in the downgrading equation.
For the residential status equation, we retain standard demographic features (gender, age,
family structure, etc). An empirical regularity is to observe a higher homeownership probabil-
ity for women. According to the life cycle, we expect that older individual are more likely to
be homeowners. The family structure of the individual is also considered: couples with chil-
dren being more susceptible to be owners, whereas the opposite is expected for single persons.
Moreover, because of the recursivity of our models, we have to impose exclusion restrictions8 in
order to identify the model’s parameters: at least one of the regressors in the residential status
equation, as well as, in the employment equation for the trivariate models, has to be excluded
from the downgrading equation. We use two instrumental variables, which are determinants of
the residential status choice, while without effects on the job downgrading. The first variable
indicates whether the individual benefited from or donated an inheritance during the preceding
survey wave. The underlying hypothesis is that this past-wave event does not modify individ-
uals current overqualification feeling, whereas it increases the probability of homeownership.
This seems reasonable to the extent that one-shot donations usually correspond to capital
amounts that are not big enough compared to labour income streams to induce a job-change.
However, this extra-capital might help to constitute the required initial down-payment that
is required for a home purchase. Secondly, we calculated quantiles of the average local taxes
(land tax and local residence tax), by urban area size and “de´partements”. We expect those
variables to represent local amenities which increase the probability of homeownership without
modifying labour market behaviours. Local taxes might also capture negative housing costs
effects. Consequently, their global impact needs to be empirically determined.
As regards the exclusion restriction to identify the probability of employment, we use an
indicator of the professional status of the individual’s mother. More precisely, the variable
indicates whether the individual’s mother was inactive or not, by the time the individual
entered the labour market. We hope to reproduce an intergenerational transmission effect of
attitude toward professional activity, while this variable should not influence residential status
choice, nor the individual’s job match. Otherwise, usual determinants of employment access
8See Maddala (1983) for a review of identification conditions in simultaneous equations recursive models.
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are used, such as gender, age, education level, labour market status of the spouse. We expect
that access to employment is favoured by schooling level. Effects of the spouse’s professional
status are undetermined as they depend on the decision making process among partners with
respect to their labour supply, domestic work sharing and income sharing [see e.g. Clark,
Couprie & Sofer (2004)].
Estimation results of the three specifications are reported in Appendix. A synthesis of
residential status effects on the job downgrading is given in Table 4.
4.1 Determinants of tenure choice
Results obtained from the homeownership equation are globally similar (in terms of significant
variables and coefficients magnitude) across the three specifications and are in line with usual
findings. For example, ceteris paribus, the probability of being an owner increases with age,
which is consistent with the traditional effects of the life cycle theory. The size of the residential
urban area decreases the probability of homeownership, as does the localization in the Parisian
area. Indeed, land-use constraints and housing market tensions in densely populated areas
typically lower accession to homeownership. All other factors being equal, women have a
higher probability to be homeowners [an empirical regularity which is obtained among others
by Munch et al. (2006) and van Vuuren (2009)]. With respect to couples without children,
those living in couples with children have a significantly higher probability to have chosen for
homeownership; we observe the opposite for single-parent families and single individuals. The
professional status of the spouse plays an important role: individuals whose spouse is employed
have a higher probability of being owners. The negative effect of having an unemployed spouse
is relatively greater than figures obtained when the spouse is inactive.
Whereas schooling level exerts some influence on residential status, there is no formal
hierarchy between degrees. Individuals with long technical education or high school certificate
are more often homeowners than people with graduate higher education. Meanwhile, these
two groups have a higher probability of homeownership with respect to individuals holding a
short technical degree, or an undergraduate degree. Indeed, labour market prospects (in terms
of career start or progress) are usually better for these two aforementioned groups. We note
as well that labour market experience favours homeownership status.
Finally, instruments used in the residential status equation are significant: having received
an inheritance or made a donation is associated with a higher probability of homeownership.
Local taxes exert a positive and significant effect on the probability of homeownership : the
influence of local amenities seems to overcome that of housing costs. Summing up, our results
regarding the determinants of homeownership in France are globally in line with usual findings.
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4.2 Selection into employment
Most of the estimated coefficients which are predictors of the employment probability are
similar across the two trivariate models (Tables 6 and 7). First of all, the instrument, namely
the individual’s mother inactivity status, exerts a significant and negative effect as expected.
Women have a lower probability to be employed, other things being equal, and family structure,
in particular the presence of children, plays an important role on labour market participation.
Individuals living in couples tend to be more often non-employed when their partner is not
working. Foreigners have a lower employment probability, highlighting employment access
difficulties of populations who are likely to be discriminated on the labour market or to lack
employment opportunities because of skill shortage, in particular with respect to language.
Age does not appear to be a strong determinant of employment probability, although
this is only true before the age fifty: afterward, professional activity is significantly reduced.
Schooling level raise employment probabilities, with effects conforming to the hierarchy of
degrees. Compared to rural areas, the localization in the Parisian region favours employment
access, as does residency in large urban areas. Conversely, individuals are more likely to be
out of employment when they live in medium size urban areas (10 000 to 20 000 inhabitants).
Lastly, time indicators exert positive and increasing effects compared to 1995: indeed,
survey years correspond to the decrease in the unemployment rate over the period 1995 to
2001 ; this also reflects the fact that employed individuals at the beginning of the survey tend
to stay under observation.
These results suggest that selection into employment is properly taken into account through
the trivariate model.
4.3 Determinants of subjective downgrading
Before addressing the residential status influence on subjective downgrading, we detail the
effects of the other explanatory variables. Most of the sociodemographic characteristics play
significantly on the individual perceptions of downgrading.
Women and foreigners have significantly lower subjective downgrading probability, with
respect to men or to French individuals. Although the existence of pure or statistical dis-
crimination against these two groups is well documented [for France, see for example Meurs
& Ponthieux (2000), Havet & Lacroix (2003), Meurs & Ponthieux (2006), Tanay & Audirac
(2001), Garner-Moyer (2003)], these results indicate that the appropriate reference standard
of each group is probably not these individuals to whom we compare them [Clark (1997)]. For
instance, if women anticipate that they will have more difficulties than their male counterparts
to reach“good” jobs, they probably integrate the existence of a differential situation as more
or less inescapable, and so have a more positive perception for the jobs which they occupy.
14
Age also influences individual perception of the adequacy of one’s skills to the job: with
regard to the youngest, individuals in their thirties or forties feel more downgraded. However,
beyond fifty years, age exercises no additional impact. We also note that labour market expe-
rience does not influence subjective downgrading probability. According to the job-matching
theory, job-match quality improves along the career path, which is not the perception of the
workers.
The probability of subjective downgrading increases with the urban area size, although
there is no clear hierarchy. One might conjecture that competition between workers and
employers power are stronger in densely populated local labour markets. Conversely, employers
might find it less desirable to under-value their employees skills in rural areas where individuals
are relatively less willing to move.
Effects related to standard internalization according to the reference group, also show up
through the impact of the individual occupational category: being in intellectual or interme-
diate professions decreases subjective downgrading, as well as being in a blue collar job (with
regards to the white collars). Working in the public sector decreases subjective downgrading.
This result is in line with di Paola & Moullet (2009) who find that civil servant status reduces
the overqualification feeling for entrants on the labour market. We find sector-based impacts
that are negative with regards to the business sector (except for the shipping industry).
Lastly, the more educated the individuals are, the more they fell downgraded, i.e. the more
they think that they could work in a job demanding higher qualifications. The educational
level is a crucial determinant of the job-match quality perceptions (and thus job satisfaction)
because workers probably tend to compare themselves with workers with identical diploma,
which is most of times a public information.
Our results show that individuals seem to assess the quality of their job-match by comparing
themselves mainly to similar workers in terms of gender, nationality, age or diploma.
4.4 Homeownership impact on job downgrading
We now turn to estimated homeownership coefficients, reported in Table 4, and in doing so,
we also examine whether they are sensitive to the econometric specification.
Firstly, we can emphasize that the correlation coefficients ρhd between the homeownership
and job downgrading equations are statistically significant in the three models. Some unob-
served characteristics play simultaneously on the likelihood of homeownership and the risk of
job downgrading. More precisely, there are unobserved factors which increase simultaneously
the homeownership probability and the subjective downgrading probability. As mentioned
earlier, if owners are characterized by specific skills in terms of negotiation or organization,
they are more likely to be sensitive to a relative inadequacy between their skills and job. In
other words, homeowners would have higher requirements and feel more easily downgraded in
a job which is not a good match. Homeownership being a socially valued status, it is possible
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Table 4: Influence of residential status on downgrading: synthesis
Probit specifications
Coeff. Bivariate Trivariate Trivariate with heterog.
Homeownership -0.509*** (0.18) -0.349*** (0.13) -0.180 (0.18)
Correlations
ρhd 0.271** (0.11) 0.180* (0.07) 0.270*** (0.10)
ρed 0.503*** (0.12) 0.323 (0.21)
ρhe 0.113*** (0.02) 0.305*** (0.05)
Heterogeneity
ν1e 1.353*** (0.11)
ν1h -0.644*** (0.08)
ν1d -0.095 (0.15)
ν2e 3.303*** (1.34)
ν2h -0.428*** (0.13)
ν2d 1.530*** (0.39)
Probabilities of each type
p1 0.736*** (0.04)
p2 = (1− p1) 0.264*** (0.04)
Notes : Significance : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%, standard errors in parenthesis.
ρhi is the correlation coefficient between the residential status equation and the employment equation (i = e)
or the downgrading equation (i = d), ρed is the correlation coefficient between the employment equation and
the downgrading equation.
that individuals having chosen this housing tenure are particularly sensitive to be employed in
a job where they can obtain a recognition of their skills. This result highlight the importance
of jointly estimating residential status choice and job-match quality perceptions indicators.
According to the bivariate model, owners more often declare not feeling downgraded, all
other things being equal. When the estimation takes into account the selection into employ-
ment, the homeownership coefficient decreases slightly and remains statistically significant.
Besides, unobserved factors in each equation are positively correlated, but the correlation be-
tween downgrading and homeownership equations falls. Part of the effect is now translated in
the positive correlation between unobserved factors that increase homeownership probability
and those affecting the employment status on one hand, and factors favouring the employment
probability and increasing subjective downgrading on the other hand. It is nevertheless del-
icate to interpret this last effect as it is. In the bivariate specification, which was estimated
on a selected sample of employed individuals, a part of the homeownership coefficient actually
reflected the higher propensity of homeowners to be in employment.
The trivariate estimation modelling unobserved individual heterogeneity with non-parametric
procedure allows to give more precise explanations. This model separates what originates from
purely stochastic disturbances from fixed effect related to unobserved attributes. Its results
show that the homeownership variable in the two previous econometric specifications actually
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captured individual heterogeneity. Indeed, the residential status as such does not affect any
more the subjective downgrading probability. Besides, correlation coefficients between home-
ownership equation and, respectively, that of the employment and the downgrading equations,
remain positive and significant, whereas the correlation between employment and downgrading
equations is no more significant.
Estimated heterogeneity terms for every equation and the probability associated with each
type of individuals indicate that the employed population is distributed in two groups. In the
first group, individuals present particular unobserved characteristics that result in lower em-
ployment and homeownership propensities, without any influence on the downgrading feeling.
In the second group, unobserved attributes simultaneously contribute to an increase of em-
ployment, homeownership and subjective downgrading probabilities. The mechanisms which
were described above are thus clarified and put in perspective according to the existence of
these two types. It seems that a part of the owners population is intrinsically characterized
by a higher probability of feeling downgraded, once taken into account observable character-
istics. Higher mobility costs of this group of owners might restrict job opportunities at career
start and then limit job transitions which could improve their job match. As such this result
raises the hypothesis of a lower productivity in employment of owners, as far as productivity
is influenced by job satisfaction, of which the downgrading feeling is one dimension.
5 Conclusion
In order to gain new insights about the benefits and the drawbacks of homeownership, this pa-
per studies the effect of homeownership on job-match quality perceptions. We also complement
the literature on the consequences of residential status, not only on labour markets outcomes,
but also on individual satisfaction and perceptions. We use a subjective job downgrading mea-
sure, available from the French data set of the 1995-2001 European Household Panel Survey.
We try to provide a robust econometric method by dealing with the endogeneity issue and
unobserved individual heterogeneity. We estimate three specifications: i) a bivariate model
on the sample of employed individuals, which simultaneously models the residential status
choice and its impact on the probability to be downgraded; ii) a trivariate model with partial
observability which takes into account the selection into employment and is estimated on the
whole population (employed and not-employed individuals); iii) a trivariate model which in
addition refines the control of unobserved heterogeneity, by using the longitudinal dimension
of the dataset.
Comparing the three models shows that taking into account the selection into employment
and controlling unobservable individual heterogeneity are of prime necessity to obtain robust
conclusions. While in the two former models homeownership has a negative and significant
influence on job downgrading perceptions, the most relevant specification concludes to no
significant effect. The estimated heterogeneity terms in this latter model indicate that part of
the homeowners population is characterized by a higher probability of downgrading perception
17
than private renters. Consequently, homeownership could be associated to some harmful effects
on the job-match quality. Our results contradict some recent papers which have established
better labour outcomes for homeowners, through lower unemployment risk [van Leuvensteijn
& Koning (2004), de Graaff & van Leuvensteijn (2007), van Vuuren (2009) and Brunet et al.
(2011)] or higher wage [Munch et al. (2008) and Brunet, Havet & Lesueur (2010)] than the
private renters. This homeownership “premium” on the labour market could be lowered when
taking into account job-match quality as measured by employees self-assessments. Whereas
realized job-matches by homeowners might not be of a lesser quality with respect to objective
or statistical measures (a point that would deserve further investigation), the downgrading
feeling of (part of) homeowners might be a source of a lower motivation, and might thus lead
to a lower productivity and career development. Extensions of our analysis to other measures
of job satisfaction would nicely complement the present study.
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6 Appendix
Table 5: Bivariate model of the downgrading and homeownership probabilities
Homeownership Downgrading
Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error
Homeowner -0.474*** (0.18)
Inheritance or donation 0.182** (0.06)
Female 0.116*** (0.03) -0.416*** (0.03)
Foreign nationality -0.294*** (0.06) -0.338*** (0.06)
Household type (Ref =Couple no child.)
Couple w. children 0.390*** (0.03) -0.003 (0.03)
Single-parent family -0.657*** (0.06) -0.172** (0.07)
Single person -0.594*** (0.05) -0.063 (0.06)
Spouse’ status (Ref =Employed Spouse)
Unemployed spouse -0.445*** (0.05) 0.073 (0.05)
Inactive spouse -0.298*** (0.04) -0.009 (0.03)
Age (Ref =17-29 years)
30-39 years 0.581*** (0.05) 0.191** (0.06)
40-49 years 0.825*** (0.07) 0.194* (0.08)
50-60 years 1.012*** (0.08) 0.124 (0.09)
Highest Degree (Ref =No diploma or second.)
Short technical educ. 0.022 (0.03) 0.205*** (0.03)
Long tech. educ.. highschool cert. 0.115** (0.04) 0.385*** (0.03)
Under. High. educ. 0.095* (0.05) 0.345*** (0.04)
Grad. High. educ. 0.004 (0.06) 0.684*** (0.06)
Labor market experience (Ref =≤ 5 years)
6-10 years 0.283*** (0.07) 0.065 (0.06)
11-20 years 0.607*** (0.08) 0.067 (0.08)
> 20 years 0.969*** (0.09) 0.106 (0.10)
Occupation (Ref =Clerk)
Intellectual prof. 0.086 (0.05) -0.304*** (0.05)
Intermediate prof. 0.064 (0.04) -0.105*** (0.03)
Blue collar prof. -0.031 (0.04) -0.193*** (0.03)
Public sector 0.133*** (0.03) -0.055* (0.03)
Activity sector (Ref =Business)
Food. consumption ind. -0.029 (0.06) -0.021 (0.05)
Motor. equipments ind. 0.249*** (0.06) -0.124* (0.05)
Inter. goods ind. 0.172** (0.05) -0.140** (0.05)
Energy. construc. ind -0.003 (0.05) -0.118** (0.05)
Transportation -0.013 (0.06) -0.185*** (0.05)
Finance. real-estate -0.206*** (0.06) -0.053 (0.06)
Business services 0.096 (0.05) -0.245*** (0.04)
Ind. or public services -0.171*** (0.05) -0.303*** (0.04)
Administration -0.189*** (0.05) -0.118** (0.04)
Significance : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 5: Bivariate model of the downgrading and homeownership probabilities
(Continued)
Homeownership Downgrading
Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error
Urban area size (Ref =rural area)
< 5000 inhabitants -0.290*** (0.06) 0.029 (0.05)
[5000− 10000[ inhabitants -0.503*** (0.05) 0.140** (0.05)
[10000− 20000[ inhabitants -0.560*** (0.05) -0.043 (0.05)
[20000− 50000[ inhabitants -0.581*** (0.05) -0.181*** (0.05)
[50000− 100000[ inhabitants -0.459*** (0.06) 0.123* (0.05)
[100000− 200000[ inhabitants -0.495*** (0.05) 0.116** (0.04)
[100000− 2000000[ inhabitants -0.631*** (0.04) 0.040 (0.04)
Parisian area -0.628*** (0.05) 0.146*** (0.04)
Amount of Local taxes (Ref =< 370 euros)
[370− 470[ 0.195*** (0.04)
[470− 580[ 0.384*** (0.04)
[580− 750[ 0.342*** (0.04)
[750 and + [ 0.350*** (0.04)
Year (Ref =1995)
1996 0.000 (0.04) 0.000 (0.03)
1997 0.013 (0.04) -0.014 (0.03)
1998 0.010 (0.04) -0.041 (0.03)
1999 0.051 (0.04) -0.037 (0.04)
2000 0.012 (0.04) -0.060 (0.04)
2001 -0.001 (0.04) -0.075* (0.04)
Constant -0.781*** (0.08) 0.444*** (0.08)
Correlation ρhd=0.251** (0.11)
χ2 4511.529
Obs. nb. 16 489
Log-likeli. -18241.079
Significance : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 6: Trivariate model: Subjective downgrading, Homeownership and partial
observability
Employment Homeownership Downgrading
Coef. and s.e. Coef. and s.e. Coef. and s.e.
Homeowner -0.349** (0.13)
Inheritance or donation 0.200*** (0.05)
Mother was inactive -0.071*** (0.02)
Female -0.930*** (0.02) 0.055* (0.02) -0.569*** (0.04)
Foreign nationality -0.155* (0.06) -0.265*** (0.06) -0.353*** (0.06)
Household type (Ref =Couple no child.)
Couple w. children -0.059* (0.03) 0.284*** (0.03) -0.093** (0.03)
Single-parent family 0.135* (0.06) -0.726*** (0.06) -0.205** (0.07)
Single person -0.067 (0.05) -0.741*** (0.05) -0.182*** (0.06)
Spouse’ status (Ref =Employed Spouse)
Unemployed spouse -0.248*** (0.05) -0.436*** (0.05) 0.041 (0.05)
Inactive spouse -0.214*** (0.03) -0.208*** (0.04) -0.008 (0.04)
Age (Ref =17-29 years)
30-39 years 0.062 (0.06) 0.633*** (0.05) 0.228*** (0.06)
40-49 years -0.015 (0.08) 0.861*** (0.07) 0.191* (0.08)
50-60 years -0.698*** (0.08) 1.128*** (0.07) -0.005 (0.09)
Highest Degree (Ref =No diploma or second.)
Short technical educ.t 0.211*** (0.03) 0.065* (0.03) 0.195*** (0.03)
Long tech. educ.. highschool cert. 0.320*** (0.03) 0.120*** (0.04) 0.416*** (0.04)
Under. High. educ. 0.497*** (0.04) 0.181*** (0.04) 0.427*** (0.05)
Grad. High. educ. 0.795*** (0.06) 0.103* (0.05) 0.780*** (0.06)
Labor market experience (Ref =≤ 5 years)
6-10 years -0.077 (0.08) 0.248*** (0.07) -0.006 (0.07)
11-20 years -0.110 (0.09) 0.542*** (0.08) -0.003 (0.09)
> 20 years 0.087 (0.10) 0.884*** (0.09) 0.068 (0.10)
Occupation (Ref =Clerk)
Intellectual prof. -0.369*** (0.05)
Intermediate prof. -0.113*** (0.03)
Blue collar prof. -0.198*** (0.03)
Public sector -0.054* (0.03)
Activity sector (Ref =Business)
Food. consumption ind. -0.068 (0.05)
Motor. equipments ind. -0.148** (0.05)
Inter. goods ind. -0.178*** (0.05)
Energy. construc. ind -0.111* (0.05)
Transportation -0.163** (0.06)
Finance. real-estate 0.002 (0.06)
Business services -0.296*** (0.04)
Ind. or public services -0.327*** (0.04)
Administration -0.175*** (0.04)
Significance : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 6: Trivariate model: Subjective downgrading, Homeownership and partial
observability (Continued)
Employment Homeownership Downgrading
Coef. and s.e. Coef. and s.e. Coef. and s.e.
Urban area size (Ref =rural area)
< 5000 inhabitants 0.098* (0.05) -0.312*** (0.05) 0.054 (0.05)
[5000− 10000[ inhabitants 0.039 (0.05) -0.411*** (0.05) 0.132** (0.05)
[10000− 20000[ inhabitants -0.153*** (0.05) -0.581*** (0.05) -0.082 (0.05)
[20000− 50000[ inhabitants 0.105* (0.05) -0.429*** (0.05) -0.168*** (0.05)
[50000− 100000[ inhabitants 0.032 (0.05) -0.327*** (0.05) 0.164*** (0.05)
[100000− 200000[ inhabitants 0.200*** (0.04) -0.504*** (0.05) 0.154*** (0.04)
[100000− 2000000[ inhabitants 0.116*** (0.03) -0.615*** (0.04) 0.081* (0.04)
Parisian area 0.224*** (0.04) -0.509*** (0.04) 0.209*** (0.04)
Amount of Local taxes (Ref =< 370 euros)
[370− 470[ 0.150*** (0.04)
[470− 580[ 0.279*** (0.04)
[580− 750[ 0.290*** (0.04)
[750 and + [ 0.365*** (0.04)
Year (Ref =1995)
1996 0.454*** (0.04) 0.039 (0.04) 0.091* (0.04)
1997 0.444*** (0.04) 0.058 (0.04) 0.078 (0.04)
1998 0.410*** (0.04) 0.045 (0.04) 0.049 (0.04)
1999 0.377*** (0.04) 0.061 (0.04) 0.037 (0.04)
2000 0.318*** (0.04) 0.059 (0.04) 0.030 (0.04)
2001 0.287*** (0.04) 0.052 (0.04) 0.026 (0.04)
Constant 1.487*** (0.09) -0.747*** (0.07) 0.313*** (0.09)
Correlations ρeh =0.113*** (0.02) ρed = 0.503*** (0.12) ρhd= 0.180* (0.07)
χ2 2797.810
Obs. nb. 18 654
Log-likeli. -26359
Significance : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 7: Trivariate model with unobserved heterogeneity: Subjective downgrad-
ing, Homeownership, Partial observability and Unobserved Heterogeneity
Employment Homeownership Downgrading
Coef. and s.e. Coef. and s.e. Coef. and s.e.
Homeowner -0.180 (0.18)
Inheritance or donation 0.214*** (0.05)
Mother was inactive -0.070** (0.03)
Female -1.143*** (0.05) 0.056* (0.02) -0.785*** (0.12)
Foreign nationality -0.225** (0.08) -0.264*** (0.06) -0.445*** (0.10)
Household type (Ref =Couple no child.)
Couple w. children -0.050 (0.04) 0.287*** (0.03) -0.135** (0.04)
Single-parent family 0.170* (0.07) -0.739*** (0.06) -0.173* (0.08)
Single person -0.111 (0.06) -0.754*** (0.05) -0.185* (0.07)
Spouse’ status (Ref =Employed Spouse)
Unemployed spouse -0.324*** (0.06) -0.444*** (0.05) 0.050 (0.07)
Inactive spouse -0.253*** (0.04) -0.218*** (0.04) -0.006 (0.05)
Age (Ref =17-29 years)
30-39 years 0.038 (0.07) 0.645*** (0.05) 0.209* (0.08)
40-49 years -0.081 (0.09) 0.885*** (0.07) 0.126 (0.10)
50-60 years -1.004*** (0.11) 1.165*** (0.08) -0.233 (0.15)
Highest Degree (Ref =No diploma or second.)
Short technical educ.t 0.262*** (0.03) 0.070* (0.03) 0.269*** (0.05)
Long tech. educ.. highschool cert. 0.413*** (0.04) 0.123*** (0.04) 0.555*** (0.09)
Under. High. educ. 0.627*** (0.05) 0.186*** (0.04) 0.582*** (0.10)
Grad. High. educ. 0.942*** (0.07) 0.110* (0.05) 1.020*** (0.15)
Labor market experience (Ref =≤ 5 years)
6-10 years -0.084 (0.09) 0.250*** (0.07) -0.021 (0.09)
11-20 years -0.075 (0.10) 0.545*** (0.08) -0.026 (0.11)
> 20 years 0.179 (0.12) 0.890*** (0.09) 0.067 (0.13)
Occupation (Ref =Clerk)
Intellectual prof. -0.465*** (0.08)
Intermediate prof. -0.134*** (0.04)
Blue collar prof. -0.231*** (0.04)
Public sector -0.066 (0.03)
Activity sector (Ref =Business)
Food. consumption ind. -0.100 (0.07)
Motor. equipments ind. -0.194** (0.07)
Inter. goods ind. -0.233*** (0.07)
Energy. construc. ind -0.139* (0.06)
Transportation -0.211** (0.07)
Finance. real-estate -0.012 (0.07)
Business services -0.379*** (0.07)
Ind. or public services -0.425*** (0.08)
Administration -0.237*** (0.07)
Significance : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 7: Trivariate model with unobserved heterogeneity: Subjective down-
grading, Homeownership, Partial observability and Unobserved Heterogeneity
(Continued)
Employment Homeownership Downgrading
Coef. and s.e. Coef. and s.e. Coef. and s.e.
Urban area size (Ref =rural area)
< 5000 inhabitants 0.133* (0.06) -0.320*** (0.05) 0.097 (0.06)
[5000− 10000[ inhabitants 0.040 (0.06) -0.421*** (0.05) 0.193** (0.07)
[10000− 20000[ inhabitants -0.177** (0.06) -0.593*** (0.05) -0.078 (0.07)
[20000− 50000[ inhabitants 0.126* (0.06) -0.436*** (0.05) -0.177** (0.06)
[50000− 100000[ inhabitants 0.011 (0.06) -0.327*** (0.05) 0.216** (0.07)
[100000− 200000[ inhabitants 0.215*** (0.05) -0.506*** (0.05) 0.222*** (0.06)
[100000− 2000000[ inhabitants 0.141*** (0.04) -0.625*** (0.04) 0.134** (0.05)
Parisian area 0.237*** (0.05) -0.514*** (0.05) 0.288*** (0.06)
Amount of Local taxes (Ref =< 370 euros)
[370− 470[ 0.140*** (0.04)
[470− 580[ 0.272*** (0.04)
[580− 750[ 0.289*** (0.04)
[750 and + [ 0.365*** (0.04)
Year (Ref =1995)
1996 0.550*** (0.05) 0.044 (0.04) 0.147* (0.06)
1997 0.546*** (0.05) 0.063 (0.04) 0.130* (0.06)
1998 0.506*** (0.05) 0.049 (0.04) 0.094 (0.06)
1999 0.469*** (0.05) 0.066 (0.04) 0.080 (0.06)
2000 0.384*** (0.05) 0.065 (0.04) 0.067 (0.06)
2001 0.346*** (0.05) 0.059 (0.04) 0.063 (0.06)
Constant 1.353*** (0.11) -0.644*** (0.08) -0.095 (0.16)
Heterogeneity ν1e =1.353* (0.11) ν
1
h = -0.644*** (0.08) ν
1
d = -0.095 (0.15)
ν2e =3.303* (1.34) ν
2
h = -0.428*** (0.13) ν
2
d = 1.530*** (0.39)
Proba. p1 = 0.736
∗∗∗ (0.04) p2 = 0.264
∗∗∗ (0.04)
Correlations ρeh = 0.305*** (0.05) ρed = 0.323 (0.21) ρhd = 0.270** (0.10)
χ2 799.382
Obs. nb. 18654
Log-likeli. -26332
Significance : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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